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Sergeiy Sandler 
Note: The text below, completed in January 2012, was originally meant to be a standalone 
article, but did not get published at the time, and my own thinking on the subject has evolved 
somewhat since. I’m currently revising it to be incorporated in a book-length philosophical 
reading of Mikhail Bakhtin’s work. Nevertheless, this older version can perhaps be of use to 
readers. I’d also be glad to receive feedback on the text (at sergeiys@gmail.com) 
 
Abstract. Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on the thought of Mikhail Bakhtin has 
received relatively little attention from Bakhtin scholars (and hardly any attention 
from Bakhtin scholars in the English-speaking world). Yet, as I argue in this paper, 
Kierkegaard was among the most important formative influences on Bakhtin's work. 
This influence is most evident in Bakhtin's early ethical philosophy, but remains 
highly relevant in later periods. Reading Bakhtin as a follower and developer of 
Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophical insights provides us with a key to the unity 
of Bakhtin's thought. 
 
One may divide the reception of the work of the Russian thinker Mikhail Mikhailovich 
Bakhtin into three waves. At first it was assimilated to familiar paradigms (Marxism, 
structuralism, poststructuralism, etc.)1 The second wave emphasized Bakhtin’s originality as 
a thinker,2 but was also prone to overstate it. The third wave, which extends to the present 
time, reacted with a more careful scholarly approach, focusing on the sources of influence on 
Bakhtin’s thought,3 but this scholarly precision sometimes came at the expense of 
understanding what is truly new in Bakhtin’s work. However, as Bakhtin himself stressed, a 
truly original utterance is original by virtue of how it incorporates within it the voices of 
those who spoke before. The role played by Bakhtin’s sources of influence on forming his 
original thought has often been neglected or deeply misunderstood. 
In this paper I focus on one particular source of influence on Bakhtin’s thought, though, as 
I shall argue, an especially important one: the Danish philosopher Søren Aabye Kierkegaard. 
                                                 
1 Typical examples are: Kristina Pomorska, Preface to Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (hereafter 
Rab.), trans. Hélène Iswolski (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), v–x; Julia Kristeva, “Préface: une poétique 
ruinée,” in Mikhail Bakhtine, La poétique de Dostoïevski (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970), 5–29, and cf. Galin 
Tihanov, “Mikhail Bakthin: Multiple Discoveries and Cultural Transfers,” Wiener Slawistischer Almanach 
Sonderband 78 (2010): 45–58.  
2 E.g. Katarina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984). 
3 E.g., Craig Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 
For a programmatic statement see: Peter Hitchcock, “The Bakhtin Centre and the State of the Archive: An 
Interview with David Shepherd,” South Atlantic Quarterly 97 (1998): 753–72. 
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I shall argue that Kierkegaard’s philosophy, especially his notion of existence and the 
reversal of traditional philosophical and metaphilosophical priorities it embodies, is crucial to 
understanding Bakhtin’s work, its originality, and its internal continuity. 
Bakhtin is notorious for rarely mentioning his sources of influence explicitly in his 
writings, and Kierkegaard, too, is mentioned in extant texts only three times, in passing 
(although in telling contexts).4 Nevertheless, we do have a direct testimony to the importance 
of Kierkegaard in the formation of Bakhtin’s philosophical outlook. In an interview recorded 
in 1973, Bakhtin vividly recounts how he became acquainted, indeed infatuated, with the 
writings of the Danish philosopher.5 Bakhtin was introduced to Kierkegaard by the Swiss 
writer Hans Limbach, who lived in Russia at the time.6 Impressed by this first encounter, 
Bakhtin acquired and read a multi-volume German translation of Kierkegaard’s work. All 
this happened in 1913, an early stage not only in Bakhtin’s intellectual development (he was 
17), but also in Kierkegaard’s reception in European philosophy. Sixty years later, Bakhtin 
still kept up with publications about Kierkegaard in Russian. 
Kierkegaard’s influence on Bakhtin has met with surprising silence from Bakhtin scholars. 
To the best of my knowledge, apart from fleeting references, there is only one article 
published in English on the topic.7 In other languages, especially Russian, the situation is 
somewhat better,8 but as important and informative as these contributions are, they do not, in 
                                                 
4 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” (hereafter AH), in Art and Answerability, trans. 
V. Liapunov (Austin, 1995), 20; Mikhail Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenij (Moscow: Jazyki slavianskikh kul’tur, 
1996–2012), hereafter Sobr., 1: 101; Rab, 120; Sobr., 4(2): 133; “Menippova satira i ee znachenie v istorii 
romana,” in Sobr., 4(1): 740; see also: AH, 118; Sobr., 1: 190. All references to Bakhtin’s works are cited both 
in the Russian original and in English translation, where available. 
5 Mikhail Bakhtin, Besedy s V. D. Duvakinym (Moskva: Soglasie, 2002), 41–43. 
6 Vadim Liapunov, “V prodolzhenie kommentarija k ‘Avtoru i geroju v esteticheskoj dejatel’nosti.’ 
Primechanie 109: Kirkegor,” in “Literaturovedenie kak literatura”: Sbornik v chest’ S. G. Bocharova, ed. I. L. 
Popova (Moscow: Jazyki slavianskoj kul’tury, 2004), 425–26. 
7 Alex Fryszman, “Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky Seen Through Bakhtin’s Prism,” Kierkegaardiana 18 
(1996): 100–125. See also: Tapani Laine, “Back to Bakhtin” (presentation, 11th International Mikhail Bakhtin 
Conference, Curituba, Brazil, July 21–25, 2003); “Back to Bakhtin 2” (presentation, 12th International Mikhail 
Bakhtin Conference, Juväskyla, Finland, July 18–22, 2005). 
8 Alex Fryszman, “Teoriia kommunikatsii Serena K’erkegora i dialogicheskoe myshlenie Bakhtina,” Wiener 
Slawischer Almanach 31 (1993): 39–55; “O Serene K’erkegore i Mikhaile Bakhtine ‘s postoiannoj ssylkoj na 
Sokrata’,” in Mir K’erkegora, ed. Aleksej Frishman [Alex Fryszman] (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1994), 106–22; 
“Ia i drugoj. Kritika romanticheskogo soznaniia u Bakhtina i K’erkegora,” Russian Literature 38 (1995): 273–
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my view, reveal the true nature and full extent of Kierkegaard’s influence on Bakhtin. This 
influence, I shall argue, goes to the very heart of Bakhtin’s philosophical motivation, and 
reading Bakhtin in this light allows for a deeper and clearer understanding of his thought. 
There are many notable similarities between the two thinkers’ positions. Nevertheless, 
what Bakhtin took from Kierkegaard were not so much specific claims and ideas, as a more 
basic metaphilosophical approach, which puts the human individual’s position in, and 
engagement with, the world above objective givenness and impersonal truth. And it is from 
this Kierkegaardian starting point that Bakhtin sets out on his own scholarly journey, a 
journey that often leads him well beyond the positions advocated by Kierkegaard himself, but 
on which he remains true to the radical metaphilosophical shift initiated by Kierkegaard. 
What Is the Kierkegaardian Revolution? 
Søren Kierkegaard belonged to a generation of European thinkers who had a crucial influence 
on the development of modern philosophy. I will refer to it as the post-Hegelian generation, 
not only because it followed Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in time, but also because 
responding to Hegel’s philosophical system, as they interpreted it, was a central project for 
these thinkers. They were significantly influenced by Hegel’s work but ultimately rejected it. 
(By using the term “post-Hegelian” I am consciously overstating the role played by Hegel 
                                                                                                                                                        
94; “Den andens stemme: Michail Bachtin og Søren Kierkegaard med særligt henblik på subjektivitetens 
problem,” in Smuthuller: perspektiver i dansk Bachtin-forskning, ed. Nina Møller Andersen and Jan Lundquist 
(Kopenhagen: Politisk revy, 2003), 153–70; “Bakhtin e Kierkegaard. Sulle tracce del pensiero dialogico. La 
scoperta di Kierkegaard da parte di Mikhail Bakhtin,” NotaBene. Quaderni di Studi Kierkegaardiani 3(2003): 
159–81; Tatiana Schittsova, “K ontologii chelovecheskogo bytiia (Kirkegor i Bakhtin),” Dialog. Karnaval. 
Khronotop 12 (1995): 34–42; “Chelovek—dialog—kul’tura (k ontologii kul’tury v ekzistentsial’noj filosofii 
Kirkegora i Bakhtina),” Mezhdunarodnye chteniia po teorii, istorii i filosofii 2 (1997): 241–48; K istokam 
ekzistentsial’noj ontologii: Paskal’, Kirkegor, Bakhtin (Minsk: Propilei, 1999); “Der Idee der ‘antwortenden 
Subjektiviät’ im Werk von Søren Kierkegaard und Michail Bachtin,” in Diskurse der Personalität, ed. 
Alexander Haardt and Nikolaj Plotnikov (Paderborn: Fink, 2008), 241–50; Tatiana Schittsova (ed.), Kirkegor i 
sovremennost’ (Minsk: RIVSHiGO, 1996); Alexander Haardt, “Ethische und ästhetische Persönlichkeit. Zum 
Verhältnis des Ethischen und Ästhetischen bei Sören Kierkegaard und Michail Bachtin,” Studies in East 
European Thought 61 (2009): 165–79. See also: Vitalij L. Makhlin, Filosofskaia programma M. M. Bakhtina i 
smena paradigmy v gumanitarnom poznanii (Moscow: MPGU, 1997); Elena Bogatyreva, “Estetika v filosofskoj 
sisteme Bakhtina” (diss., Moscow State University, 1991); Edward Kasperski, Dialog i dialogizm. Idee, formy, 
tradycje (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, 1994); Kierkegaard: antropologia i dyskurs o czlowieku 
(Pultusk: WSH, 2003). I am grateful to Tapani Laine, Danuta Ulicka, and Elena Bogatyreva for providing me 
with information on many of the references in the last two notes. 
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himself, as towering a figure as he was; other thinkers made important contributions to the 
positions post-Hegelianism reacted against, which are also relevant to the aims of the present 
paper,9 but a focus on Hegel does make for a clearer exposition of the issues at stake; Hegel’s 
name is used here symbolically, somewhat like Descartes’ name is, when speaking broadly of 
modern philosophy as “Cartesian”). 
Hegel’s philosophy is notoriously difficult and a brief exposition cannot possibly do it 
justice. Nevertheless, I will try to touch on a few central points, as a necessary background 
for the rest of the discussion. 
Hegel was a systematic idealist philosopher, i.e. he sought to provide a unified 
philosophical account of consciousness and, through it, of the world. In the Phenomenology 
of Spirit,10 Hegel introduced his system by presenting and describing what he called Absolute 
Spirit. To borrow a few metaphors from the exact sciences, Absolute Spirit is like a four-
dimensional fractal object (or rather subject11). It is four-dimensional in the sense that it 
includes within itself not only its final (three-dimensional) form, but also the entire historical 
process of its development.12 It is fractal in the sense that the entire structure and 
development of Absolute Spirit is the result of the reiteration of a simple operation, which is 
for Hegel also the essence of human consciousness and the main building block of his new 
science of logic: the activity of negation.13 
Propelled by the force of negation, consciousness commences on a journey, at once 
historical and epistemological, from the immediate givenness of the objects of perception as 
not-itself to eventually recognizing itself in the world and its history. On this journey it 
moves from sense perception, through social relations, various historical forms of social 
order, reason, and religion, to an eventual state of scientific-philosophical knowledge, in 
which it possesses a system of science that accounts for all of these as belonging to 
consciousness itself. 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Fryszman, “Ia i drugoj.” 
10 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (hereafter PS, cited by paragraph number), 
trans. Arnold Vincent Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). 
11 Ibid, §17. 
12 Ibid, §12. 
13 Ibid, §18. 
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As Jon Stewart notes,14 the notion of system in German idealism implies an organic unity. 
Indeed, for Hegel, the organic unity of his system of science subsumes under it the seeming 
contradictions produced by the negating activity of consciousness. Eventually, consciousness 
recognizes itself as an organic unity which comprises the world. The subject is an organic 
unity, living in the organic unity of a social order, which has developed through the organic 
unity of history, and now allows for absolute scientific knowledge which coincides, also as an 
organic unity, with revealed religion. Like the plant Hegel himself uses as a metaphor,15 his 
entire philosophical system, in all its different and seemingly incompatible historical forms, is 
a whole in which every part and stage is necessary. 
Thinkers of the post-Hegelian generation formed their philosophical outlooks at a time 
when Hegel’s system was considered an unsurpassed achievement. Indeed they all absorbed 
much from Hegel. But it was precisely the all-encompassing nature of the Hegelian system, 
its claim to be the ultimate totality of philosophical truth, which posed for them with the 
utmost clarity a new kind of philosophical question: the question about the point of this 
exercise, and by extension, of philosophizing. One answer to this question was succinctly 
formulated by Karl Marx in 1845: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point is to change it.”16 Ten years earlier, Kierkegaard, the other great post-
Hegelian, wrote this oft-quoted passage in his journal: 
What I really need is to get clear about what I must do, not what I must know, except 
insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to find a purpose, to see 
what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth which is 
truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die.17 
                                                 
14 Jon Stewart, “Hegel’s Phenomenology as a Systematic Fragment,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel 
and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
76–78. 
15 PS, §2. 
16 Karl Marx, “Concerning Feuerbach,” in Early writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), 423.  
17 Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers. Vol. 5, Autobiographical, 1829–
1848, trans. Howard Vincent Hong, Edna Hatlestad Hong and Gregor Malantschuk (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1978), 34. 
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Kierkegaard then goes over the parts of Hegel’s system – the history of philosophy, the 
state, religion, and truth itself – and asks the same question about each of them: What is the 
point of knowing these things from his own subjective perspective?18 
This passage is, however, easy to misunderstand. Kierkegaard does not merely draw a 
distinction between knowledge and action, or between secular knowledge and religious faith, 
or between the objective and the subjective. Nor does he simply favor one side of these 
dichotomies over the other. After all, had he had a complete theory of action, of religion, of 
the subject, he would still be thus “constructing a world [he] did not live in but merely held 
up for others to see.”19 
Kierkegaard wants a kind of philosophy that would tell him not what he must know but 
what he must do. Well, is not “What must one do” the central question of ethics? Yes. And 
indeed, the ethical occupies a central place in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. But traditionally, 
ethics seeks to derive the answer to the question “What must one do” from general principles, 
i.e., from the answer to the question “What must one know.” Nor is it a coincidence that 
ethics asks “What must one do,” while Kierkegaard asks “What must I do.” For Kierkegaard 
the question, “What must I do” cannot be reduced to the question, “What must anyone in my 
position do,” nor even to the question, “What must anyone like me do in my position.” 
Religious duty is deeply individual and cannot be generalized into a rule. 
But Kierkegaard’s main philosophical innovation is more essential still. It has to do, as I 
already noted, with philosophy’s purpose: to answer the demands not of objective knowledge 
about things in the world but of the individual person with her unique perspective, with what 
truly matters to her. Again, it is easy to miss Kierkegaard’s point. Isn’t subjectivity central to 
all modern philosophy, from Descartes on? It is, but not for its own sake. For Descartes, 
subjective self-knowledge is a means to avoid error. Possessing the truth about reality is of 
intrinsic value; what this truth and this reality mean to the individual is not. Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit tells a story whose main protagonist is human consciousness, but 
the individual consciousness matters to Hegel where and when it eventually conforms to the 
logical scheme he proposes. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, while not disputing the truth of 
                                                 
18 Kierkegaard, Journals 5, 34–35. 
19 Ibid. 
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objective knowledge and the validity of logic,20 claims philosophical primacy for the moral 
concerns and the first-person perspective of the concrete human individual. 
This is, in fact, no less than a philosophical revolution. At least since Parmenides, it has 
been taken for granted by philosophers that what is constant underlies what is changeable. A 
substance is what remains the same when a thing undergoes change; objective truth is what 
holds equally well for any person. Even most subjectivists and relativists accept this order of 
priority, that is to say, they do not deny the primacy of what remains constant and holds for 
all over what is subjective, changing, or relative; they merely deny that there is anything that 
can attain this higher status. What Kierkegaard proposes, on the other hand, is that an 
individual’s attitude to reality, to her life, ultimately to God, differs sharply from one person 
to another, but at the same time, it is in this realm of inwardness, that the highest 
philosophical and religious truth resides. Whatever is common to all people is not denied, but 
deemed less important. 
This point is further developed when Kierkegaard discusses his version of the distinction 
between existence (esse) and possibility (posse), or between the actual and the potential.21 
What is conceived of in thought is merely possible or potential. But my own existence and 
my own acts are actual for me. An actual act goes beyond all thought, beyond the question of 
what would performing such an act mean to such a person as myself. It is no longer a matter 
of the mere possibility of acting in a particular way; it is the thing itself. This simple gap 
between the act itself and the potential content assigned to it by thought is a gap that thought 
can pretend to ignore, but cannot bridge.22 Objective truth and knowledge can supply me with 
potentialities, with descriptions of how things might be. Actually living through the thing 
itself is a different matter altogether. This actuality is beyond the reach of mere knowledge, 
beyond the reach of general principles. Knowing what to do does not yet mean doing it; 
acknowledging a truth does not yet mean truly accepting it.23 
                                                 
20 M. G. Piety, “The Reality of the World in Kierkegaard’s Postcript,” in International Kierkegaard 
Commentary, Vol. 12: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments,” ed. Robert L. Perkins 
(Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997), 169–86. 
21 Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard 
Vincent Hong and Edna Hatlestad Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 1: 318–43 (hereafter 
CUP). 
22 Ibid, 1: 323. 
23 Ibid, 1: 22. 
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Existence also means constant becoming. Any attempt to sum up an individual is doomed 
to failure, at least from that individual’s own perspective. When summing up, one has to look 
back, but in existence one always moves forward.24 An individual may, at least on some 
occasions, decide to change herself, to overcome any given objective description. Any 
abstract notion of what people are in general, of what subjectivity is in general, fails precisely 
because of its generality. It offers no account of what my subjectivity means to me.25 A 
system (an organic unity) that contains individual existence in it is impossible, other than 
from God’s perspective,26 because individual existence will always transcend it, will not 
allow the system to reach completeness. 
Moreover, this process of constant becoming crucially involves what Kierkegaard called 
leaps. To make a leap is not merely to undergo change and development, because 
development can be immanent, a move from one state to the next can follow logically from 
what the first state involves and includes. But to make a leap means accomplishing a shift 
from one existential state to another, the possibility of which contradicts what defines the 
former state, a contradiction that cannot be subsumed under a higher systematic unity, at least 
not from the perspective of the person performing the leap. 
Earlier I noted several times that Kierkegaard is easy to misunderstand. Why? Because a 
philosopher who takes as her starting point the postulates that Kierkegaard rejects will be 
blind to what he has to say. This is especially true when one subordinates one’s entire 
philosophy to logic. Such an approach is prone to deny there is anything to the first-person 
perspective that does not fit into the logical scheme, precisely because it does not fit into it, 
or conversely, to pretend that the first-person perspective does fit the logical scheme, that is, 
to substitute a logical replica of subjectivity for the real thing.27 
This approach can also be applied to Kierkegaard himself. One may easily cull some 
particular claims and arguments from Kierkegaard’s writings and present those as his 
philosophy. After all, isn’t philosophy all about propositions and arguments? But a 
proposition is true or false regardless of whether anybody holds it, rejects it, or is even aware 
of it. An argument moves from its premises to its conclusion regardless of whether anybody 
in fact argues it. Kierkegaard’s own propositions and arguments, if taken to be mere 
                                                 
24 Ibid, 2: 187. 
25 Ibid, 1: 120. 
26 Ibid, 1: 118–25. 
27 Cf. Ibid, 1: 123. 
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propositions and arguments, are no different. Kierkegaard insists that the individual’s attitude 
to the content of a proposition has priority over the content of the proposition in itself, indeed 
that it is in this relation that truth resides. But isn’t this itself a proposition, the objective truth 
or falsity of which will now be a matter for philosophical discussion and debate? Such a 
meta-philosophical position, dooms Kierkegaard’s project, if interpreted strictly within it, to 
failure, indeed to self-contradiction or to infinite regress (as the primacy of one’s inward 
relation to this proposition is asserted, the assertion would itself be a proposition, and so on, 
ad infinitum).28 The key to understanding Kierkegaard’s import to philosophy is to 
understand his main meta-philosophical point. 
The philosophical primacy of existence over possibility, of subjective truth over objective 
truth, also led Kierkegaard to problematize the communicability of subjective truth. 
Communicating a proposition means stating it. But how does one communicate one’s deep 
inner relation to a proposition? Claiming to hold a certain relation by explicitly stating what it 
is would only return us to the same question at one remove: how does one communicate 
one’s deep inner relation to this latter statement? Was it stated in earnest or in jest?29 This is 
not to say that Kierkegaard thought communication of one’s inner truth to be entirely 
impossible. Inwardness can, up to some degree, be communicated, but such communication 
has to be indirect. It has to pass through what Kierkegaard called “double reflection”: the first 
reflection merely provides the objective content of the message; the second reflection relates 
this message to its utterer and to the receiver. It is this second reflection that can uncover 
(although this successful outcome is by no means guaranteed) the inner truth hidden within 
the message.30 
Kierkegaard’s own message was all but ignored by his contemporaries. He remained 
virtually unknown for decades after his death, and even now, as a classic of modern 
philosophy, he is still often misinterpreted. But in the remainder of this paper I will focus not 
on how he was misunderstood, but on how his thought was, I think, deeply and originally 
understood and appropriated by Mikhail Bakhtin. As I will show below, Bakhtin develops 
Kierkegaard’s philosophical revolution in a most original and interesting way. Conversely, 
                                                 
28 Cf. Ibid, 1: 333. 
29 Cf. Ibid, 1: 69–70. 
30 See, e.g., James Kellenberger, Kierkegaard, Indirect Communication, and Religious Truth, International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 153–160. 
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Bakhtin’s own philosophy can only be deeply understood if his debt to Kierkegaard is 
acknowledged and kept in mind. 
Kierkegaard and Bakhtin’s Philosophical Motivation 
There are many similarities between Kierkegaard’s philosophy and Bakhtin’s works. For 
example, both thinkers claim that only from God’s perspective can an individual’s existence 
be viewed as a totality.31 Both also distinguish between objective and subjective truth.32 
Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication is echoed in Bakhtin’s and the Bakhtin 
Circle’s theory of language, most notably in Bakhtin’s notion of double-voiced discourse.33 
These parallels (and others34) are striking, and they warrant scholarly attention, but they do 
not reach the full depth of Kierkegaard’s influence on Bakhtin, an influence which has to do 
with the philosophical motivation these thinkers share, with how they understand the point of 
philosophizing. This motivation informs Bakhtin’s work in all areas and in all periods, but it 
is especially evident in the surviving fragment of his earliest, unfinished, major work,  toward 
a Philosophy of the Act (written most probably in the early 1920s35). In this work, Bakhtin 
argues for a first philosophy36 at the center of which stand the act (or, to render it more 
precisely, the deed, postupok), and the event of being (sobytie bytiia). I shall discuss the event 
of being (the germ of what later was labeled “dialog”37) further below. Here I would like to 
focus on the notion of the deed, which is key to properly understanding Bakhtin’s early 
philosophy. 
                                                 
31 CUP, 1: 118; Nikolai Nikolaev (ed), “M. M. Bakhtin’s Lectures and Comments of 1924–1925. From the 
Notebooks of L. V. Pumpiansky” (hereafter Lect.), trans. Vadim Liapunov, in Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling 
for Faith, ed. Susan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 193–237; 
Sobr., 1: 328–30. 
32 CUP, 1: 189–251; Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act (hereafter TPA), trans. Vadim 
Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 46; Sobr., 1: 43. 
33 Fryczman, “O K’erkegore i Bakhtine,” 121; Schittsova, “Chelovek—dialog—kul’tura”. On double-voiced 
discourse see: Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (hereafter PDP), trans. Caryl Emerson 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 185–204; Sobr., 2: 81–101, 6: 207–228. 
34 For additional parallels see the works by Schittsova and Fryszman referred to above.  
35 On the dating of Bakhtin’s early works see Liudmila Gogotishvili, in Sobr., 1: 414–17; Nikolai Nikolaev 
and Vadim Liapunov, in Sobr., 1: 495–503 (commentary to Sobr. is cited by indicating the commentator(s) and 
page numbers only). 
36 TPA, 27–28; Sobr., 1: 28–29. 
37 See: Tatiana Schittsova, Sobytie v filosofii M. M. Bakhtina, Minsk: I. P. Logvinov, 2003. 
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The title  toward a Philosophy of the Act (given to this work by its publishing editors, 
as Bakhtin’s original title is unknown) is potentially misleading. It suggests that this work is 
devoted to the philosophical exploration of a specific kind of phenomenon, the act/deed. But 
Bakhtin’s actual aim was to approach the most basic philosophical questions; the deed is a 
way in which Bakhtin characterized the ultimate reality, as he understands it. 
The deed is active, but it is not merely an action. It is intentional (and motivated38), but is 
not the same as an intentional act.39 It belongs to the realm of the ethical, but not merely in 
the sense of being related to mores and norms.40 While the word “deed” implies a particular 
action, Bakhtin uses it to refer to human existence more generally: “For my entire life as a 
whole can be considered as a single complex act or deed that I perform.” 41 He also does not 
understand the deed as necessarily distinct from thought.42 A thought is as much a deed for 
Bakhtin as an action in the narrow sense, provided that it has actually been thought by an 
actual individual, it is a deed so long as it was indeed performed: 
In other words, Bakhtin’s notion of the deed is clearly parallel to Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of existence. This becomes all the more obvious if we consider the deeply 
personal nature of the deed, as reflected even in the language of  toward a Philosophy of the 
Act: instead of voicing claims in the third person about “the subject,” “the self,” “the I,” 
Bakhtin typically uses the first person singular (this is not how the text is narrated, but how 
specific philosophical claims are made), emphasizing the unique and unrepeatable nature of 
personal experience and action: “That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone 
else.”43 
This personal actuality of the deed is not the product of the general form of the subject, of 
what anyone would experience and do in my place. Thought, as an actual deed, is prior to the 
general rules of logic: “The course from a premise to a conclusion is traversed flawlessly and 
irreproachably, for I myself do not exist upon that course.”44 In this Bakhtin consciously 
challenges modern philosophy as such: 
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All of modern philosophy sprang from rationalism and is thoroughly permeated by the 
prejudice of rationalism (even where it consciously tries to free itself from this 
prejudice) that only the logical is clear and rational, while, on the contrary, it is 
elemental and blind outside the bounds of an answerable consciousness, just as any 
being-in-itself is.45 
Bakhtin explicates his notion of the deed using oppositions, such as those between the 
answerable deed and theory, participative thinking (uchastnoe myshlenie) and theoretism, life 
and culture, fact and content, subjective truth (pravda) and objective truth (istina), etc. The 
terms comprising these oppositions often appear interchangeable, but, in fact, they differ 
from each other in important senses. One such difference is that between theory and 
theoretism. 
Theory is the product of the scientific study of objective reality. As such it is limited to the 
objective moment of deeds, to objective truth, and is unable to grasp the deed itself. To 
illustrate the point, consider a map of the world. The map is a theoretical representation of 
the Earth’s surface. If we imagine that map to be large and detailed enough, it will be 
possible to locate in it the place in which I am now sitting and writing. But the way in which 
the map represents space is radically different from the way in which I now experience it. On 
the map (qua theoretical representation) all points are of equal value, but for my space there 
are at least two points that are privileged: the point from which I am observing the world and 
the point to which I am directing my attention. The map is also indifferent to the fact that 
some locations in space have special meaning for me: places that I intend to visit or wish to 
avoid, a place I call “home”, etc. The map successfully captures all the objective properties 
and relations of the represented space, but space as it exists for me, while there is nothing in it 
that is incompatible with all those objective properties and relations, is not map-like. The map 
reflects valuable theoretical knowledge. It is also a useful artifact. But theory, precisely 
because it provides objective knowledge, just cannot grasp what I see right now and how I 
see it, nor can it tell whether there is anybody looking at the world from this vantage point I 
am occupying or not. 
Nor will more theory make any difference. If we augment geography with optics or even 
psychology, we will still have no access to how I experience the world and act in it. 
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Theoretical knowledge for Bakhtin is potential: it tells us much about what a person would 
experience if she did this or that, but cannot replace the actual deed and experience. 
In arguing so, Bakhtin does not wish to undermine the legitimate and important pursuits of 
theory and science; nor does he deny the objectivity of scientific claims.46 What Bakhtin 
rejects is not theory, but theoretism, which is the view that the objective statements of the 
sciences and of logic represent and exhaust the ultimate reality. Theory, argues Bakhtin, 
cannot be the first philosophy, precisely because the deed, the actuality of human action and 
experience, is inaccessible to it. On the contrary, the deed, even though it is not objectively 
valid for all, should be the ground on which the first philosophy is to be built, because 
nothing stays out of its purview. 
Bakhtin distinguishes between the fact and the content of a deed and between the given 
(dan) and the posited, or required (zadan), in it. I am now sitting here and writing. This is a 
fact for me. The words I am writing, the objects I see, etc. belong the content of this fact. All 
content is accessible to theory, but the fact of me acting upon it and experiencing it is not. All 
these objects and words are given as objective entities, but for me they are no mere objects 
and no mere words. What I am doing gives each of them a value: Here is the keyboard I am 
using, the mug with coffee I am reaching for, the disturbing noises from outside. The world 
for me is value-laden, or, to use Bakhtin’s term (which is a modified version of a central term 
in neo-Kantian philosophy), posited. The given is objective, and is thus accessible to theory. 
The posited is not, because it depends on my choices and purposes. 
A first philosophy grounded in the deed is blind to nothing. All objective content is 
included in deeds, my own and others’.47 The world-as-posited already contains within itself 
the world-as-given. The shift to such a philosophy does not require us to give up on scientific 
progress. It merely demands a change in the philosophical order of priorities, precisely the 
change heralded by Kierkegaard: to put the individual above what is common to all. 
But if we commit to theoretism, we end up with an unbridgeable chasm between the world 
of science and culture on the one hand and people’s lived experience of the world on the 
other. This chasm was widely discussed in the early 20th century as the divide between life 
and culture,48 and Bakhtin argues in effect that it is an artifact: the divide only appears 
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unbridgeable from a theoretist perspective. On the other hand, all attempts to bridge it that 
maintain a commitment to theoretism are liable to make an even graver error: to deny the 
very existence of the deed, of individual experience and action, worse still, to substitute a 
theoretical (e.g. psychological) transcription for the real thing. 
This error is especially tempting for the human sciences, and it creates a problem not 
merely on the philosophical meta-level, but also for the sciences themselves. Linguistics 
serves as the Bakhtin Circle’s favorite illustration of this point. Language is not, essentially, a 
phenomenon of the material world. It is rather part of human existence: “Historically 
language grew up in the service of participative thinking and performed acts”.49 Attempting 
to study language as a closed system of objective phenomena, ignoring its role in actual 
deeds, leads to a basic error: misidentifying the object that linguistic science studies.50 This in 
turn leads to the inability of such a science to grasp the meaning of actual utterances, which 
Bakhtin and Voloshinov illustrate in several works.51 
The terms “theory” and “theoretism” target a specific opponent: neo-Kantianism, 
especially of the Marburg school, which at the time was rapidly losing its status as the 
dominant school in German philosophy, and which was represented in Bakhtin’s own social 
and intellectual environment by his close friend, Matvei Issaievich Kagan, a student of 
Hermann Cohen. To be sure, Bakhtin’s attitude toward neo-Kantianism is a complex and 
controversial issue (which deserves a separate study; I will limit myself here to a brief 
remark). Bakhtin was clearly and significantly influenced by Hermann Cohen, Ernst Cassirer, 
and other neo-Kantian thinkers, and openly admitted it.52 Nevertheless, the central 
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metaphysical claim of neo-Kantianism, that the world of phenomena is revealed by the 
theoretical sciences, which are in turn grounded in logic,53 was clearly unacceptable to 
Bakhtin, for the same reasons that Hegel’s doctrine was unacceptable to Kierkegaard. 
Bakhtin greatly appreciated the achievements of neo-Kantianism, and adopted many neo-
Kantian positions, but he also clearly stated that neo-Kantianism cannot claim the status of 
first philosophy, because the deed, human existence, remains utterly and necessarily outside 
its scope.54 
But, like Kierkegaard before him, Bakhtin has more than a philosophical school in mind in 
his critique. First, within philosophy and the human sciences, theoretism is a label that he 
applies to practically all modern thought.55 Beyond the sciences, theoretism for Bakhtin is 
merely a symptom, one distinctly modern way of avoiding responsibility, of seeking, as he 
put it, “an alibi in being”, of dissolving my acting self in objective content.56 In this Bakhtin’s 
philosophy resembles that of other existentialists, from Kierkegaard on. 
More than other forms of existential thought, however, Bakhtin’s first philosophy 
specifically resonates with the radical shift in philosophical motivation that Kierkegaard has 
wrought. It questions the status of systematic knowledge about the world, which is in the end 
incommensurable with the life of the human individual, and proclaims individual human 
existence to be a more central philosophical concern than objective truth as such. 
One More Post-Hegelian Move and Two More Leaps 
So far I have focused on a central argument that the early Bakhtin inherited from 
Kierkegaard. But Bakhtin was also influenced by others. What I think makes Kierkegaard’s 
influence on Bakhtin special is that Bakhtin adopted more than just a set of positions from 
Kierkegaard; he adopted an approach to philosophy, visible not only where he accepts 
Kierkegaard’s points, but also where he goes beyond them and even against them. 
As noted above, in Toward a Philosophy of the Act Bakhtin argues for a first philosophy 
grounded in the deed. Now, considering the individually unique nature of the deed, one 
wonders how any kind of philosophy can be grounded in it. Bakhtin’s reply, in his early 
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works, is that first philosophy provides a phenomenological description of the architectonics 
of individual existence as an event. Let me unpack this formula. Recall that from my unique 
perspective, and given my particular purposes and values, the world appears to me in a 
unique way. For Bakhtin this is not how the world merely appears; rather, it is a reality that 
can then be studied using the phenomenological method.57 The reality of the deed is 
populated not only by objects, but also by other individuals, with whom I interact, who matter 
to me. But there is one person crucially and necessarily missing from this reality: myself. 
Another can see me in the world, as I can see her, but I cannot see myself. “I love another, 
but cannot love myself; the other loves me, but does not love himself.”58 Bakhtin’s first 
philosophy thus centers on self—other relations, which he refers to as “the event of being” 
(sobytie bytiia). The event of being has no pre-given structure that is the same for all, but it 
does have what Bakhtin calls an “architectonics”: It is constructed and negotiated around 
three essential points of reference: I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the other.59 
The I-for-myself is not a subject in the traditional philosophical sense. It is a subject of 
experience and action but not a subject of reflection.60 To become a subject I have to be 
supplemented by my own self-image, but this image is, again, unavailable to me directly. 
Only the other can see me as part of her world, can form a coherent image of me (and I can 
reciprocate: this is the other-for-me), and only from the other can I receive myself as a gift.61 
My only access to an image of myself is through the eyes of the other. As a subject of 
reflection, as an object of self-knowledge, as part of the world’s content, as a coherent unity, I 
belong to the other (I-for-the other). 
This philosophical move, central to Bakhtin’s thought, appears to be incompatible with the 
emphasis Kierkegaard puts on subjectivity, inwardness, and self-knowledge62 (although some 
passages in Kierkegaard’s writings63 are closer to Bakhtin’s position). Instead, if we search 
the history of philosophy for a claim that the subject is formed through the other, we will find 
it, ironically, in Hegel’s philosophy. In part B of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel claims 
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that consciousness first truly becomes self-consciousness by virtue of the recognition it 
receives from another consciousness.64 
The similarity appears striking, but a closer look shows the crucial differences: according 
to Hegel, even though the need for recognition by others never disappears, self-consciousness 
eventually reaches unity. It becomes a subject of both perception and reflection, but already 
as a precondition for this, it becomes part of the unity of Spirit, of a “We”. It then partakes in 
the greater unity of a social-political order, a system of science, a logical system of absolute 
knowledge – all these unities are eventually perceived as such from the point of view of the 
consciousness itself. Bakhtin, on the other hand, denies the possibility of unification from the 
individual’s own viewpoint. If such a unity is possible, it is only possible from the point of 
view of the other. My image of myself, received from others, can never unite with the I-for-
myself. 
Bakhtin states this point most clearly in his discussion of a situation in which one 
examines one’s reflection in the mirror.65 Seemingly, this situation is a counterexample to 
one’s inability to see oneself in the world, but, explains Bakhtin, only seemingly: “It is not 
that I look from the inside with my own eyes at the world, but rather I look at myself through 
the eyes of the world, through alien eyes; I am possessed by the other”.66 The image I see in 
the mirror corresponds to how I might appear to another, and it is how another person would 
evaluate this image that mostly concerns me when I examine my reflection. On the other 
hand, the mirror image does not and cannot coincide with my inner sense of myself. My 
thoughts and feelings may be reflected on my face as it appears in the reflection, but this 
“external image of thought, feeling”67 is radically different from how I experience my 
thoughts and feelings from within. The resulting image of myself is bifurcated: “There is no 
naïve oneness of the external and internal here”.68 The I-for-myself and the I-for-the other fail 
to merge. 
Nor is it the case (as some neo-Kantians might argue) that, by obtaining ever new and 
better perspectives, I will, in time, approach a perception of myself as a whole. Such 
asymptotic approximation is possible, according to Bakhtin, when understanding another 
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(person, culture, utterance), but never does this asymptote approximate my view of myself. 
On the contrary, it leads away from it.69 
Bakhtin’s philosophical move can thus be viewed as post-Hegelian, that is, as based in 
many respects on Hegel (and his heritage in German philosophy), but rejecting the heart of 
Hegel’s system. And it is specifically the Kierkegaardian kind of post-Hegelianism that we 
see here, one that rejects systematicity, the claim to unification, so long as the individual 
person’s own perspective is concerned. This post-Hegelian stance not only characterizes 
Bakhtin’s early philosophy, but runs through all the periods and subjects of his work. It 
remains a motivating philosophical principle for Bakhtin, a vector specifying the direction his 
work assumes, even as it absorbs a diverse array of other influences and sources. I will 
illustrate this briefly with a few examples. (The topics I touch on from this point on deserve a 
thorough discussion in a longer work; here I will only sketch the major themes in Bakhtin’s 
oeuvre, as they relate to the topic of this paper, in crude lines). 
Bakhtin’s work on carnival studies a phenomenon that is in many ways the cultural 
equivalent of the I-for-myself. Bakhtin emphasizes that carnival actively involves the entire 
people, and thus does not allow the distance necessary for aesthetic perception, for the culture 
to form a holistic impression of it.70 Accordingly, carnival culture does not form an organic 
unity with the official culture of its day. Rather, it forms antibodies that make it possible to 
reject the inert discourse of official medieval culture.71 It forms a counter-current that can 
never be sublated into a higher cultural unity. True to its carnivalesque ancestry, the novel 
does not fit into a systematic theory of literary genres.72 
The crown of Hegel’s system is the integration of revealed religion in systematic 
philosophy. Bakhtin cries foul: “The only possible way of philosophically discussing 
systematic philosophy is by proceeding from within systematic philosophy itself.”73 Bakhtin 
damns all major systematic philosophers with anthropomorphism. They all include in their 
seemingly systematic philosophy traces of the specifically human way of perceiving the 
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world.74 But it is precisely this human way of perceiving the world that is the only possible 
starting point for a philosophy of religion, for religion itself.75 
Many other Bakhtinian themes center on the representation of the human being as 
unfinalizable, as unable to form a coherent whole, from the point of view of the second 
person. Before discussing specific examples, I should briefly explain how such representation 
is possible in Bakhtin’s philosophical framework. Recall that Kierkegaard describes an 
individual’s move from one mode of existence to another as a leap, that is, as impossible 
from the individual’s position within the former mode. Bakhtin, while not using the same 
term, fully embraces this description.76 As Bakhtin argues at length in  toward a Philosophy 
of the Act, a person seeking to avoid answerability by only recognizing content as real has to 
make a leap, precisely Kierkegaard’s leap of decision, to recognize her own existence, the 
actual and irreversible nature of her deeds. This is an impossible feat for her to perform from 
her own perspective, since an outlook that only recognizes the reality of content (theory) has 
no access to the deed and no ability to account for it. However, having embraced her 
existence and freedom, the individual now has one more leap to make to attain true peace of 
mind, equivalent to Kierkegaard’s leap of faith. Despite her inability to perceive herself as a 
whole and despite her responsibility and guilt, she has to trust the other (and God in 
particular) to do the impossible: to see her as a coherent whole, and to forgive her.77 
But on top of these two leaps, performed from the first-person perspective, Bakhtin also 
proposes a similar progression, involving two leaps, from the point of view of the other. In 
the first leap, the other (author, scholar, reader or listener) forms a coherent view of her 
object as a whole (the perception of an individual or a literary character as an aesthetic object, 
or the view of a field of natural or human phenomena as an organic, rather than a mechanical, 
unity). This requires the other to forego any presence in the perceived and described whole, 
to commit “absolute self-exclusion”.78 (This is to some extent analogous to the movement of 
resignation, which is an essential condition for performing the leap of faith according to 
Kierkegaard). But following this, the road is opened to another, higher, impossible 
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achievement – representing the unfinalizability and freedom of the human object of 
description. 
Bakhtin devoted much of his work to studying the historical development of the cultural 
forms that prepare for this last leap. The representation of the human body in grotesque 
imagery avoids the aesthetic completeness of the human image,79 and instead portrays the 
human being’s open and active points of contact and merger with the world. An intellectual 
equivalent appears in Menippean satire, whose characters openly discuss their most 
fundamental beliefs on the thresholds of heaven and hell.80 The novel brings into the purview 
of literary culture and language, and further develops, hybrid forms of discourse, which 
prevent the closing-off of the speaker’s intention. The most striking example is double-voiced 
discourse of the active type, in which the speaker’s discourse is permeated with an 
anticipation of her audience’s response.81 This line of development culminates in 
Dostoevsky, who finally accomplishes the leap and creates a polyphonic novel, in which the 
characters are represented in all their ethical freedom. But the leap again involves resignation: 
Dostoevsky has to forgo any use of his surplus of vision as an author, i.e. his ability to 
represent his characters beyond the reach of their own purviews, his privileges as an author.82 
The same progression of two leaps also appears in Bakhtin’s discussions of language and 
of the philosophy of the human sciences. In his (unfinished) article “The Problem of Speech 
Genres”, written in the early 1950s, Bakhtin insists on the importance of perceiving an 
utterance holistically for understanding it. The meaning of an utterance as a whole cannot be 
reduced to the meanings of the individual words and sentences composing it, and only 
through this holistic meaning does language come into contact with the world and with 
speakers and listeners.83 But then Bakhtin also insists that this holistic meaning of the 
utterance is never final, that the true meaning of an utterance is given in the ever-changing 
chain of dialog, in which it is but one link, and therefore that this meaning changes with 
every response the utterance receives.84 Similarly, the human sciences have to form a holistic 
impression of their object of study, legitimately abstracting away from the essential ethical 
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freedom of the human beings that form this object; they have to become theories.85 But this is 
merely the first step. The second step is to turn scientific inquiry into a form of dialog with 
the object of study, thus recognizing its unfinalizability as a person: “The being of the whole, 
the being of the human soul, freely revealing itself to our act of knowledge, cannot be bound 
by this act in any significant aspect.”86 
Conclusion 
In this essay I argued that Kierkegaard’s philosophy was a central influence on Bakhtin. But 
not all influences were created equal: some are superficial, others run deep. That is certainly 
true in Bakhtin’s case. From some he merely borrowed terms, others raised problems and 
developed concepts that he dealt with extensively, others still had a much deeper influence on 
him, but essentially as adversaries – he adopted many principles and ideas from them, while 
rejecting the very core of their philosophical systems, as was the case with Hegel and (I 
would argue) the Marburg neo-Kantians. 
But there is, Bakhtin claims, a level of response higher than disagreement: agreement.87 
On this higher level, for Bakhtin, we find the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. Bakhtin not 
merely adopted the reversal of metaphilosophical priorities that Kierkegaard called for, but 
made it his own, developed it in new and unexpected directions. Those who fail to realize 
Kierkegaard’s influence will find it difficult to see the true originality of Bakhtin’s early 
philosophy, to understand what he has in mind when he talks about the actuality of concrete 
individual experience and action.88 Once we do recognize this influence, and read Bakhtin’s 
works with it in mind, we can see the importance of his work. Bakhtin’s original choice to 
study not only human existence as such, but also its cultural representation, allowed him to 
develop conceptions of language, literature, and culture that are truly grounded in actual 
individual existence in all its concreteness, without theorizing this concreteness away. 
Paradoxically, then, Kierkegaard’s influence on Bakhtin is the sort of influence that 
explains the originality of a thinker no less than his indebtedness to others. 
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